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Abstract 
Mentally rehearsing unfamiliar first names for the purpose of categorizing them into a group 
produces both preference for and, more surprisingly, identification with the group of names (i.e., 
association of the names with self; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002). The present research 
started as an effort to determine how these ‘implicit partisanship’ effects of stimulus exposures 
differed from the well-known mere exposure effect and whether mental rehearsal might play a 
role in both phenomena.  Four experiments found that the parallel effects on liking and 
identification (association with self) occurred (a) more strongly for stimuli that were mentally 
rehearsed than for ones that were passively exposed, (b) equally for stimuli rehearsed 
individually versus categorized in groups, (c) consistently for both self-report and implicit 
measures, and (d) across substantial variations of stimulus types and of mental rehearsal 
procedures. The findings are interpreted as identifying a shared theoretical ingredient of implicit 
partisanship and mere exposure effects, linking these two effects more generally to phenomena 
of implicit self-esteem, including minimal group and mere ownership effects. 
 Keywords: mere exposure; mere ownership; mental rehearsal; implicit partisanship; self 
and memory 
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Mental Ownership: Does Mental Rehearsal Transform Novel Stimuli Into Mental 
Possessions? 
Minimal group experiments have regularly shown that leading people to believe that they 
have similar reasoning styles, art preferences, or other similarities with a group of strangers 
causes them to identify with and favor the people in that group (Tajfel et al., 1971). Even more 
surprising, however, is that people spontaneously identify with groups without any superficial 
similarity (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) or even association with the group (Greenwald et al., 2002). In 
one of the most minimal procedures demonstrating this, memorizing four first names together as 
a group increased both implicit identification with and preferences for the memorized group of 
names relative to groups represented by unrehearsed names (Greenwald et al., 2002).  This 
‘implicit partisanship’ effect occurred in the absence of any instruction for subjects to consider 
themselves a member of the (hypothetical) group represented by the studied names. Further 
experiments with stimuli quite different from the personal names of the first experiments (e.g., 
fictitious car brands) found this same pattern of dual effects on both implicit and self-report 
measures of liking and identification (Pinter & Greenwald, 2004; 2011).  
Because the stimuli in implicit partisanship studies were relatively unfamiliar to 
participants, these studies shared a procedural ingredient with the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 
1968), the finding that repeated passive exposure to unfamiliar stimuli increases liking. At the 
same time, the implicit partisanship procedure differs from most prior mere exposure findings in 
three ways:  First, it involves instructed mental rehearsal of the unfamiliar stimuli rather than 
passive exposure; second, it uses a single sustained 45-second exposure to the stimuli rather than 
repeated briefer stimulus presentations; and third, stimuli were presented as a group rather than 
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individually.  The initiating, exploratory goal of this research was to evaluate and separate these 
three possible causes of the implicit partisanship finding.   
Each of the four experiments in this report extended the generality of the original 
findings, while evaluating the three initially plausible causes.  To anticipate the conclusion that 
emerged: The present findings identify a shared theoretical ingredient of implicit partisanship 
and mere exposure effects, linking these two effects with multiple previously identified 
phenomena that have been considered indicators of implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995), including minimal group and mere ownership effects. These in turn support a theory that 
connects attitude, identity, and self-esteem (Greenwald et al., 2002).   
Similarities Between Mere Exposure and Implicit Partisanship Procedures 
Although mere exposure is widely considered to involve passive (unrehearsed), repeated 
exposure to stimuli (see Bornstein, 1989), mere exposure procedures have often incorporated 
some degree of mental rehearsal. Participants in mere exposure experiments are sometimes asked 
to memorize the repeatedly exposed stimuli (e.g., Newell & Bright, 2001; Stang, 1975, Studies 
2–3) or to attend selectively to some stimuli while ignoring others (Raymond, Fenske, & 
Tavassoli, 2003; Fenske, Raymond, & Kunar, 2004; Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009).  Even 
without an explicit rehearsal task, procedures such as those instructing subjects that they are in a 
study of “verbal learning” (e.g., Stang, 1975, Study 1, p. 7) or “visual memory” (e.g., Zajonc, 
1968, Experiment 3, p. 18) may encourage subjects to mentally rehearse the repeatedly presented 
stimuli, rather than just observing them passively. Because both mere exposure and implicit 
partisanship procedures may entail mental rehearsal, there is a possible explanatory overlap that 
has not previously been explored.  
Challenges in Connecting to Theories of Mere Exposure Effects 
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Despite the procedural similarities to mere exposure just described, the implicit 
partisanship findings appear inconsistent with a theoretical proposition that has been prominent 
in discussions of mere exposure effects in the past 25 years.  Whereas implicit partisanship 
studies suggest that active mental rehearsal of stimuli increases liking of those stimuli, one of the 
best established theories of the mere exposure effect suggests that repeated exposure effects may 
sometimes be weakened when procedures create good recall or recognition memory of the 
repeatedly presented stimuli (Bornstein, 1989; see also Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Kunst-
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Moreland & Zajonc, 1979). This perceptual fluency/misattribution 
theory holds that subsequent encounters with repeatedly presented stimuli are processed with 
improved ease of processing (fluency), which facilitates a liking judgment (Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1992; 1994).  It has also been hypothesized that this fluency effect can be 
discounted when experimental procedures draw subjects’ attention to the prior presentations in a 
way that may lead subjects to credit those prior presentations as the basis for any experienced 
ease of processing (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; cf. Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; 
Schwarz et al., 1991; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013).     
In addition to the empirical support for the related fluency/discounting and 
fluency/misattribution accounts of repeated exposure effects, there are findings that demonstrate 
the reverse.  For example, Lee (1994) showed that mere exposure effects are not always 
eliminated when subjects are given an alternative explanation for perceptual fluency (Lee, 1994), 
and Bornstein (1989) reported that complex (less fluently processed) repeatedly exposed visual 
stimuli show stronger repeated exposure effects than simple stimuli (Bornstein, 1989). Multiple 
additional studies, including those in the implicit partisanship tradition, show that instructions to 
remember or attend to stimuli, which must call attention to the repeatedly presented stimuli and 
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therefore provide a possible basis to discount processing fluency, nevertheless increase liking 
(Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002; Pinter & Greenwald, 2004; Stafford & Grimes, 2012; 
Stang, 1975; Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009).  
While the fluency discounting and misattribution theories suggest that mental rehearsal 
has the potential to undermine repeated exposure effects, other theories used in explaining 
repeated exposure effects suggest that mental rehearsal might increase those effects. In addition 
to increasing processing fluency, rehearsed exposures should increase judged familiarity, which 
is presumably a more consciously perceivable effect.  Berlyne (1970) and Stang (1975) both 
proposed that more familiar stimuli should be less threatening and anxiety-inducing than 
unfamiliar stimuli, which could be the source of increased liking (see also Lee, 2001; Wang & 
Chang, 2004). Similarly, Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) theorized that increased fluency due 
to repeated presentations would enhance positive mood directly, thereby producing increased 
liking.  
In sum, available theories from the mere exposure tradition are equivocal on expectations 
for effects of mental rehearsal, the most salient procedural ingredient of the implicit partisanship 
effect.  The other two possible procedural causes of the implicit partisanship finding—grouped 
presentations of stimuli and sustained (rather than repeated brief ) presentations—do not readily 
align with any of the existing mere exposure theories.  An exploratory evaluation of the three 
suspected procedural causes is therefore likely to yield an empirical answer that cannot be 
anticipated from existing theory. Also of interest was to observe whether the two parallel 
measures in the implicit partisanship procedure (liking and identification) would remain linked. 
Present Research 
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To achieve clearer understanding of the relationships among mental rehearsal, mere 
exposure, and implicit partisanship, the present studies sought to determine which of the 
empirical components of the implicit partisanship procedure was (or were) responsible for the 
observed effects on liking and identification.  The role of those components was tested by 
varying the nature of the rehearsal task and the presence or absence of stimulus groupings. To 
extend generality, the present experiments also varied types of stimulus materials and dependent 
measures, using both implicit and explicit measures of liking and identification.  As was hinted 
in the opening paragraph (and will be elaborated in the General Discussion), the findings 
provided a basis for finding a common theoretical theme in implicit partisanship and mere 
exposure, plausibly also extending to the collection of implicit self-esteem effects described by 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995), including minimal group and mere ownership effects.    
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Experiment 1: Rehearsal Task – Memory search in a set of memorized letters 
Experiment 1 examined whether a set of mentally rehearsed stimuli would be evaluated 
more positively, on both implicit liking and identification measures (as used in implicit 
partisanship procedures), than comparable stimuli that were attended without rehearsal (passive 
exposure). To ensure rehearsal, participants completed a Go/No-go task that required them to 
rehearse letter sets. Because they rehearsed the same letter set continuously, this procedure 
corresponded more closely to past implicit partisanship procedures than to mere exposure 
procedures.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 85 undergraduate students from the University of 
Washington Psychology Department participant pool (mean age = 18.78, SD = 1.01; 68% 
female; 47% White, 30% Asian). Data were collected until the end of the academic term because 
the study served as an opportunity for students to receive partial course credit for their 
participation. One participant was excluded from analyses for excessive speed while completing 
the IAT measure (10 percent or more of their latencies were faster than 300 ms). In this and 
subsequent studies, we have reported all exclusions, measures, and manipulations. 
Procedure 
Each participant completed a Go/No-go rehearsal task, followed by either implicit liking 
or identification measures.  
Go/No-go rehearsal task. Participants read these instructions for the adaptation of the 
Go/No-go task: 
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Whenever you see any of four specific letters — G, J, F, or C [or K, L, Z, or N] — you 
should rapidly press the SPACEBAR. When you see any other letters, DO NOT PRESS ANY KEY 
— pressing a key will be scored as an error.  Instead, just wait for the next letter. Please operate 
the spacebar with your LEFT hand for these trials.  In the next set of trials we will ask you to 
switch to using your right hand. 
The Go/No-go task had two 36-trial blocks, and the letter stimuli were counterbalanced 
so that participants received either the letters G, J, F, C or K L, Z, N as the rehearsed set; the 
other was the non-rehearsed set. Letters in the two sets were matched in attractiveness, as 
reported by Greenwald & Banaji (1995). Half of the letters in each trial block were from the 
rehearsed set (appeared on the screen until participants pressed the spacebar), and half were from 
the non-rehearsed set (appeared on the screen for one second), with each letter having nine 
presentations in the two blocks. Participants pressed the spacebar with their left hand in the first 
block and with their right hand in the second block so as not to associate (in anticipation of the 
IAT dependent measure) either a left-hand or a right-hand response with the letter set that 
required spacebar responses.  
Implicit liking and implicit identification. Participants next completed a measure of 
either implicit liking or implicit identification, using an Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The implicit liking measure compared attitudes toward 
the four rehearsed and the four non-rehearsed letters by comparing response times on a block in 
which the rehearsed set shared a response key with a set of five pleasant words (i.e., good, agree, 
nice, friend, truth) to a block in which the rehearsed letter set shared a response key with a set of 
five unpleasant words (i.e., bad, vomit, ugly, horrible, wrong). As in all subsequent experiments, 
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the order in which participants completed the two types of blocks was counterbalanced in these 
IATs.  
The implicit identification measure used the same IAT procedure but with self words 
(self, me, my, mine, I) and other words (other, they, them, their, theirs) replacing pleasant and 
unpleasant words. Both IATs were scored using the IAT D measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003)  so that higher values of the D measure indicated implicit preference for or greater 
implicit identification with the rehearsed letter set. 
Results 
The rehearsed letter set was indeed more liked (M = 1.07, SD = 1.00), t(40) = 6.83, p = 
10–8, d = 1.07, and more identified with (M = 0.48, SD = 1.00), t(42) = 3.17, p = 0.003, d = .48. 
Whether GJFC or KLZN was assigned as the rehearsed or non-rehearsed set did not affect results 
for implicit liking, F(1,39) = 0.62, p = 0.44, or implicit identification, F(1,41) = 2.57, p = 0.121.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that mental rehearsal enhances positive affect toward 
repeatedly exposed stimuli, which contradicts the PF/M expectation of reduced effects when 
presented stimuli are better remembered (Bornstein, 1989; see also Bornstein & D’Agostino, 
1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Moreland & Zajonc, 1979). This rehearsal benefit occurred 
on both liking and identification (association of self), making this the first study to demonstrate 
that repeated exposure effects may extend to identification with novel objects, although a direct 
test of this would require a comparison to novel stimuli not presented in the rehearsal task 
                                                          
1 All participants in Experiments 1-3 completed a second set of tasks with new stimuli (go/no-go task, followed by 
the same dependent measures) in order to lengthen the study to half an hour. To economize on presentation, we only 
present full details in the online supplement. However, the second set of tasks fully replicated the rehearsal effect in 
Experiments 1-3, ps < 0.04, ds > 0.38. 
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(addressed in Experiment 4). These findings were obtained with implicit measurement, which 
makes it less plausible that the effect of rehearsal was due to demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) 
resulting from participants’ knowledge of an additional task for one subset of letters. 
Experiment 2: Rehearsal Task With Procedural Control 
In Experiment 1, presentations of rehearsed stimulus letters differed from those of non-
rehearsed letters in having the requirement of a spacebar-press response. To determine whether 
the observed benefit of rehearsal in the experiment was an artifact of this response requirement, 
Experiment 2 included a comparison condition in which the spacebar response was required only 
on non-rehearsal trials. Experiment 2 also supplemented the implicit dependent measures with 
explicit measures of stimulus liking and identification. . 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 367 undergraduate students from the University of 
Washington Psychology Department participant pool (mean age = 19.26 years, SD = 1.50; 62% 
female; 47% White, 35% Asian). Data were collected until the end of the academic term because 
the study served as an opportunity for students to receive partial course credit for their 
participation. Fifteen participants were excluded from analyses, including three for experimenter 
errors that caused loss of data, six for having previously participated in a pilot study that is 
reported in the online supplement, and eight for excessive speed while completing the IAT 
measure (10 percent or more of their latencies were faster than 300 ms). These losses reduced the 
sample to N = 350.  
Procedure 
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Each participant completed one of two versions of a Go/No-go rehearsal task, followed 
by either liking or identification measures (2x2 between-subjects design). Implicit measures 
always preceded parallel explicit measures in this experiment.  
Go/No-go rehearsal task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two task 
conditions that varied whether a spacebar response was required for the rehearsed (identical to 
Experiment 1) or the non-rehearsed letter set. Participants pressing the spacebar on non-rehearsal 
trials read the following instructions: 
Whenever you see any of four specific letters — G, J, F, or C [or K, L, Z, or N] — you 
should CONFIRM THAT IT IS ONE OF THESE FOUR LETTERS and do nothing else.  Instead, 
just wait for the next letter. When you see any other letters, you should rapidly DISMISS THEM 
FROM THE SCREEN by pressing the space bar. 
The Go/No-go task was otherwise identical to that of Experiment 1.  
Implicit liking and implicit identification. Participants next completed a measure of 
either implicit liking or implicit identification, using the same IAT procedure as in Experiment 1. 
Both IATs were scored using the IAT D measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003)  so that 
higher values of the D measure indicated implicit preference for or greater implicit identification 
with the rehearsed letter set. 
Explicit liking and explicit identification. For the self-report parallels to the IAT 
measures, participants viewed 16 pairs of letters and selected either (between-subjects, randomly 
assigned) the one “you find more attractive” (explicit attitude) or the one “you regard as more 
strongly associated with you” (explicit identification).  The series included all possible pairings 
of the four rehearsed letters with the four non-rehearsed letters, with the appearance order of 
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these 16 pairs randomized and with rehearsed letters appearing equally often as the left or right 
letter in the displayed pair. Liking and identification for rehearsed over non-rehearsed letters was 
calculated as a percentage, then centered at 50 and divided by the standard deviation of all 
ratings, in order to make this measure comparable to the implicit measure. Positive scores thus 
indicated more frequent selection of rehearsed letters, measured in SD units. 
Results  
Figure 1 displays summary results for both implicit and explicit measures of attitude and 
identification. The rehearsed set was significantly more liked and more identified with than the 
non-rehearsed set, for implicit liking, t(180) = 11.28, p = 10–22, d = 0.84, explicit liking, t(180) = 
4.57, p = 10–5, d = 0.34, implicit identification, t(168) = 8.89, p = 10–15, d = 0.68, and explicit 
identification, t(168) = 6.50, p = 10–9, d = 0.50. The implicit and explicit measures were not 
significantly correlated for either liking, r(180) = .07, p = 0.37, or identification, r(168) = .12, p 
= 0.112. 
The moderator variable of interest—whether the spacebar was used to signal the 
rehearsed or the non-rehearsed set—mostly did not moderate magnitude of preference for the 
rehearsed set, ps > 0.41. The minor exception was that using the spacebar for the rehearsed set 
(M = .53, SD = 1.00) compared to the non-rehearsed set (M = .16, SD = .98) produced a stronger 
rehearsal benefit on the explicit liking measure, F(1,179) = 6.21, p = .01. 
                                                          
2 The benefits of rehearsal were greater when GJFC appeared as the rehearsed set than when KLZN appeared as the 
rehearsed set on explicit, F(1,179) = 8.33, p = 0.004, and implicit liking, F(1,179) = 5.66, p = 0.02,  but not on 
explicit, F(1,169) = 1.02, p = 0.314, and implicit identification, F(1,167) = 2.01, p = 0.16. 
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Discussion 
These results replicated and extended Experiment 1’s findings of both greater liking for 
and greater identification with repeatedly presented stimuli that were mentally rehearsed as a 
group compared to stimuli that were attended without rehearsal.  These findings were obtained 
for both implicit and explicit measures and could not be attributed to a procedural artifact of 
drawing more attention to one set of stimuli (higher goal relevance) by requiring a space bar 
press for them.   
Experiment 3: Rehearsal of Images 
The rehearsal task for Experiment 1 and 2’s letter stimuli presumably required a rehearsal 
process described by Baddeley (2003) as the phonologic loop, “an articulatory rehearsal process 
that is analogous to subvocal speech” (p. 830). Experiment 3 extended the research by examining 
whether mental rehearsal would have the same benefits for image stimuli that have no 
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Figure 1. Experiment 2’s implicit and explicit liking and identification findings, collapsed over 
counterbalanced procedure variables.  Measures are reported in standard deviation units to permit 
comparison of effect magnitudes across measures and experiments. Positive scores indicate greater 
liking for or greater identification with rehearsed than non-rehearsed stimuli. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals.
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established pronounceable representations, therefore obliging participants to rehearse in a visual 
mode, corresponding to Baddeley’s (2003) visuospatial sketchpad. The stimuli were abstract 
images that were used successfully in previous repeated exposure research (Bornstein, 1989).  
Method  
Participants. Ninety five undergraduate students from the University of Washington 
Psychology Department participant pool (mean age = 20.42, SD = 4.27; 56% female; 39% 
White, 39% Asian) participated. Of these, two were excluded from analyses, one for having 
completed a pilot study (reported in the online supplement) and one for excessive speed while 
completing the IAT measure (10 percent or more of latencies faster than 300 ms). These losses 
reduced the sample to N = 93. Data were collected until the end of an academic term because the 
study served as an opportunity for students to receive partial course credit for their participation. 
Procedure. Participants completed the same Go/No-go procedure as in Experiment 2 that 
required them to press a spacebar for the instructed stimulus set (the memory set), with the 
exception that “go” trials only remained on the screen for 1 second and were thereafter scored as 
an error if participants had not responded3. Stimuli consisted of six abstract images (3 in the 
memory set and 3 non-rehearsed) from the Welsh Figure Preference Test (Welsh, 1959).  Each 
stimulus was presented on 12 of the 72 test trials.  The image stimuli were counterbalanced so 
that half of the participants received each of the two sets as their memory set. Participants then 
completed the measures of implicit and explicit liking or identification (in that order) that were 
used in Experiment 2, but with Experiment 3’s image stimuli in place of Experiment 2’s letter 
stimuli.  
                                                          
3 On average, participants made relatively few errors on both “go” (M = 0.13%, SD = 0.54) and “no-go” trials  (M = 
1.45%, SD = 2.40), suggesting that the task was effective as a manipulation of rehearsal. 
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Results 
Figure 2 shows that the Welsh images in the rehearsed memory set were both more liked 
and more identified with than were those in the non-rehearsed set for all four dependent 
measures: implicit liking, t(44) = 7.17, p = 10–8, d = 1.07; explicit liking, t(44) = 6.08, p = 10–7, d 
= .91; implicit identification, t(47) = 7.69, p = 10-10, d = 1.11; and explicit identification, t(47) = 
5.68, p = 10-6, d = .824. Implicit and explicit measures were not significantly correlated in this 
experiment, either for liking, r(44) =  –.10, p = 0.50, or for identification, r(47) = .16, p = 0.28. 
Discussion 
These results extended the findings of greater liking for and identification with stimuli 
rehearsed as a group phonologically to include stimuli rehearsed in a visual mode. Rather than 
confirming theoretical interpretations of mere exposure predicting that recognition memory 
should impair stimulus liking (e.g., PF/M; Bornstein), these findings are consistent with implicit 
partisanship findings predicting that categorization of stimuli into groups enhances liking and 
identification (Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002). However, because these findings may 
stem from stimulus rehearsal rather than categorization, Experiment 4 was designed to 
disentangle the roles of rehearsal and stimulus grouping in producing increased liking and 
identification with the rehearsed stimuli.  
 
                                                          
4 The benefits of rehearsal were greater when image set 2 (see stimuli below) appeared as the rehearsed set than 
when image set 1 appeared as the rehearsed set on explicit identification, t(30) = 2.23, p = 0.034, and implicit liking, 
t(43) = 2.73, p = 0.009, but not on explicit liking, t(43) = 1.34, p = 0.19, or implicit identification, t(46) = -0.17, p = 
.86. 
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Experiment 4a & 4b:  Rehearsal Task: Display search for images or letter strings held in 
working memory 
 To compare effects of mental rehearsal and stimulus grouping, Experiment 4 varied 
whether the rehearsal task involved rehearsing items individually (“singletons”) or in groups of 
three (“trios”).  Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the rehearsed item or item set in Experiment 4 
varied from trial to trial rather than being fixed, thereby more closely resembling procedures of 
past mere exposure experiments.  This required participants to hold stimuli in memory repeatedly 
for brief periods of time instead of continuously across all trials. The experiment also included a 
comparison to novel stimuli to directly compare the effect of rehearsal to the mere exposure 
effect and provide a baseline for establishing directions of changes in the varied rehearsal and 
grouping conditions. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 3’s implicit and explicit liking and identification findings, collapsed over 
counterbalanced procedure variables. Positive scores indicate greater liking for or greater 
identification with rehearsed stimuli relative to non-rehearsed stimuli. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Method 
Participants.  Four hundred sixty-seven students from the University of Washington 
Psychology Department participant pool (mean age = 19.12, SD = 1.60; 58% female; 54% 
White, 25% Asian) participated in Experiment 4a.  One hundred thirty-two of these were 
excluded from analyses, including 82 for a programming error that sacrificed control over 
stimulus appearances5, 32 for excessively fast or slow responses to the Brief IAT (more than 10 
percent of latencies faster than 300 ms or more than 5 percent of latencies slower than 5 seconds; 
cf. Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), 13 for experimenter errors that caused loss of data, and 5 who 
were discovered to have participated in one of the preceding experiments. These losses reduced 
Experiment 4a’s sample to N = 335. Data were collected until the end of the academic term 
because the study served as an opportunity for students to earn needed partial course credit. 
Experiment 4b’s participants were 205 undergraduate students from the same participant 
pool (mean age = 19.00, SD = 1.73; 70% female; 46% White, 33% Asian). Participant losses 
were 45, including 34 for a programming error, 8 for excessive speed in responding to the BIAT, 
2 for experimenter error, and 1 for having completed one of the preceding experiments. These 
losses reduced Experiment 4b’s sample to N = 160. Data were again collected until the end of the 
academic term. 
 In total, Experiments 4a and 4b had 495 participants. However, both experiments varied 
which type of dependent measure, BIAT or self-report, appeared first in the procedure, and the 
extra stimulus exposures in the BIAT procedure contaminated hypothesis tests for the subsequent 
                                                          
5 Some exclusions led to imbalanced N’s across conditions, but results for Experiments 4a and 4b were unchanged 
when including all participants in analyses and when analyzing effects of counterbalancing conditions. See online 
supplement for details of statistical tests. 
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self-report measures (see Procedure for more information). Thus, the present Results section 
presents self-report data only for participants who completed those measures prior to the BIAT 
(n = 251).   
Procedure. All participants completed a rehearsal task, followed either by explicit 
measures (liking, attractiveness, and identification in a random order, followed by a stimulus 
familiarity measure) or by a BIAT examining implicit liking of novel stimuli as compared to 
rehearsed or non-rehearsed stimuli (varied between subjects). Because the BIAT only compared 
a subset of stimuli (either rehearsed to novel stimuli or non-rehearsed to novel stimuli), this 
resulted in many additional exposures to some stimuli but not to others. As a result, the 
subsequent explicit measures were no longer an appropriate test of the hypothesis that rehearsed 
versus non-rehearsed stimuli (when equally presented) would be more liked, so we do not 
present those analyses in the Results – we only present the results for explicit measures occurring 
before the BIAT. Results of explicit measures occurring after the BIAT appear in the online 
supplement in Table S2, but they do not change the conclusions presented in the main text. 
Stimulus design. For each participant, there were nine target images (abstract Welsh 
figures, as used in Experiment 3) and nine target letter strings. The letter strings consisted of five 
letters in a pronounceable CVCVC string (C=consonant; V=vowel; e.g., nedag, polov, tazon, 
cemef, lirak; also used by Stang & O’Connell, 1974). Counterbalanced in a Latin Square design, 
each stimulus was used equally often in a set of three that were always presented as a trio during 
the rehearsal task, a set of three that were always presented individually during the rehearsal task 
(singletons), and a set of three that were novel comparison stimuli, which were only used in 
dependent measures. 
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Rehearsal (2-back) task—Experiment 4a. To allow within-subjects variation of 
rehearsal versus non-rehearsal, Experiment 4 adapted a 2-back memory procedure that is often 
used as a memory load manipulation in cognitive research (see review in Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Participants viewed a series of stimuli with the instruction to judge, for 
one of the two types of stimuli, whether the current stimulus was identical to the one presented 
two trials previously. The type of stimulus presented on odd-numbered trials (letter strings or 
images, counterbalanced) was the type to be rehearsed.  Participants therefore knew that the 2-
back task (i.e., the rehearsal requirement) never applied to the other type of stimulus (Figure 3 
schematizes the stimulus sequence for Experiment 4a.). 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of a 5-trial segment of Experiment 4a’s procedure. Participants 
viewed a series of stimuli with the instruction to judge, for the type of stimuli 
presented on odd-numbered trials, whether the current stimulus was identical to the 
one presented two trials previously. Stimuli presented on odd-numbered trials were 
the type to be rehearsed; those presented on even-numbered trials were not 
rehearsed. Experiment 4b’s rehearsal task was modified by allowing participants to 
control stimulus durations, rather than using the fixed durations shown in this figure. 
(50 ms
blank)
(50 ms
blank)
(50 ms
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Same as last string?
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Rehearsed and non-rehearsed stimuli could appear either as singletons (presented for 1 
second) or as trios (presented for 3 seconds). For each odd-numbered trial, participants had two 
instructed tasks: (a) respond to the current stimulus (press right key if the same stimulus had 
been presented two trials previously, left key if not) and (b) rehearse this same stimulus in 
anticipation of the test on the next odd-numbered trial. After the singleton or trio on each odd-
numbered trial, the screen remained blank until participants responded to indicate same or 
different. For even-numbered trials, the singleton (1s) or trio (3s) was presented after a very brief 
(50 ms) blank screen following the participant’s response to the preceding odd-numbered trial. 
After that singleton or trio presentation, another brief blank screen preceded the following (odd-
numbered) trial.   
The 74 trials (37 with each type of stimulus) appeared in a quasi-random order6. The 
presented stimuli, which were presented eight times each, included the three rehearsed singletons 
(3 x 8 = 24 trials) and a set of three rehearsed trios of the same stimulus type  (1 x 8 = 8), as well 
as three non-rehearsed singletons (3 x 8 = 24 trials) and three non-rehearsed trios of a different 
stimulus type (1 x 8 = 8). Ten other trials contained filler stimuli, as described in Table 1, which 
shows the stimuli viewed by an example participant. 
  
                                                          
6 The stimulus trial order was random with two exceptions. First, the stimulus type (abstract image or letter string) 
alternated on each trial. Second, to sustain participants’ engagement in the task, 9 trial pairs that required a “same” 
response were inserted at set points throughout the task, ensuring that at least 24% of the odd (rehearsal) trials 
required a “same” response. 
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Table 1 
Example of Stimulus Presentations for a Participant Randomly Assigned to Rehearse Letter 
Strings and Passively View Images in Experiment 4 
Stimulus Rehearsal Condition Stimulus Role 
No. 2-Back 
Appearances  
Self-
Report Implicit 
Tazon Rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
Cemef Rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
Polov Rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
lirak kigep jacud Rehearsed Trio 8 x - 
holum sutiz nedag Rehearsed filler stimuli Trio 4 - - 
Vupic 1st trial filler stimulus Singleton 1 - - 
Bunat - Novel stimulus 0 x x 
Rowib - Novel stimulus 0 x x 
Dimoc - Novel stimulus 0 x x 
 
 
 
Non-rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
 
 
 
Non-rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
 
 
Non-rehearsed Singleton 8 x x 
 
 
Non-rehearsed Trio 8 x - 
 
 
 
Non-rehearsed filler stimuli Trio 4 - - 
 
 
 
2nd trial filler stimulus Singleton 1 - - 
 
 
 
- Novel stimulus 0 x x 
 
 
 
- Novel stimulus 0 x x 
 
  
 
- Novel stimulus 0 x x 
Note. Rehearsed and non-rehearsed filler trios were included in the rehearsal task. If we had only 
included the single target trio throughout the task, participants might have discovered that they 
could respond with “same” anytime a trio appeared on adjacent odd trials, without needing to 
attend to the specific stimuli in the trio. Filler stimuli for the 1st and 2nd trials were also included 
to allow participants to acclimate to the task before using target stimuli that would ultimately 
appear in dependent variables.  
  
Running head: MENTAL REHEARSAL 
Rehearsal (2-back) task—Experiment 4b.  The 2-back task was modified by allowing 
participants to control stimulus durations. This provides a basis for generalizing to natural 
situations that allow voluntary control of stimulus viewing, as has been done in some mere 
exposure research (e.g., Stafford and Grimes, 2012). Participants’ control over durations was 
limited by obliging a minimum 1-s duration for each stimulus. Rehearsed stimuli required two 
keyboard responses, first a choice between “same” and “different” for the 2-back task, and 
second a spacebar response to proceed; non-rehearsed stimuli required only the spacebar to 
proceed.  
Explicit liking and identification. Participants completed self-report measures for all 
nine letter strings and all nine images (including the three (novel) stimuli of each type that were 
never presented in the 74 trials of the 2-back task).  Order of these 18 stimuli was randomized.  
For each stimulus, participants responded to three questions that were presented in randomized 
order: “How attractive or unattractive do you find this stimulus?”; “How much do you like or 
dislike this stimulus?”; “How strongly do you identify with this stimulus?” Response options 
ranged from 1 (unattractive or dislike or do not at all identify) to 7 (attractive or like or strongly 
identify). The ratings of attractiveness and liking were highly correlated, Experiment 4a: r(167) 
= .64, p = 10–20; Experiment 4b: r(82) = .56, p = 10–8. These two ratings were therefore averaged 
for each stimulus type for the explicit liking measure. To be consistent with previous 
experiments, identification was examined separately (see Table 2 for correlations between 
identification and the composite liking measure). In order to facilitate comparison between 
explicit and implicit measures, liking and identification for novel stimuli was subtracted from 
that for trios or singletons, then divided by the pooled standard deviations of ratings for each 
category, separately for letter strings and images and trios and singletons. Positive scores thus 
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indicated greater liking for or identification with rehearsed or non-rehearsed trios or singletons 
relative to novel stimuli, measured in SD units. 
Table 2 
Correlations Between Explicit Liking and Identification Measures in Experiment 4 
Stimulus type Rehearsed 
Non-
rehearsed Novel 
Images .56a .49b .48c 
 Strings .57b .46a .44c 
 
Note. All participants rated both novel images and strings in dependent variables. However, 
participants only rehearsed either images or strings in the procedure, so these ratings have a 
smaller n.) All ps < 0.001.  
 
a N = 154. b N = 97. c N = 251  
Familiarity. After the explicit liking and identification measures, participants responded 
to the question, “How many times have you seen this stimulus?” for each of the 18 stimuli (9 
images and 9 letter strings), presented in randomized order. Participants entered responses by 
typing in a box in response to the request to “Type a number between 0 and 50 into the box, then 
click ‘Enter.’”  
Implicit liking. Participants completed a Brief IAT (BIAT) in this experiment instead of 
the Standard IAT used in Experiments 1-3, but the procedure was otherwise the same with one 
major exception. Whereas the IATs in Experiments 1-3 showed the individual stimuli as part of 
the category heading in order to facilitate categorization, the BIAT in Experiment 4 did not. 
Instead, the BIAT was preceded by a categorization task in which participants learned which 
stimuli would be part of the arbitrary categories, “Set A” and “Set B,” and then practiced 
classifying them into these sets. Only then did they complete a full BIAT where they classified 
word stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant.and letter string or image stimuli into Set A or Set B. It is 
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easy enough to see (but it was appreciated only in retrospect) that the practice task amounted to 
rehearsal of the novel set, plausibly contaminating the BIAT by repeated presentations of the 
novel stimuli. For this reason, the results should be interpreted cautiously7. The BIATs were 
scored using the IAT D measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003)  so that higher values of 
the D measure indicated implicit preference for the rehearsed or non-rehearsed letter set over the 
novel stimuli. 
Results 
 Effects of rehearsal did not differ for Experiments 4a and 4b, ps > 0.44, so results are 
collapsed across the two experiments. 
Explicit liking and identification. Four findings were apparent for the liking and 
identification data (see Figure 4). First, rehearsed stimuli (collapsed across singletons and trios) 
were both more liked and more identified with than novel stimuli. Second, non-rehearsed stimuli 
were both more liked and more identified with than novel stimuli. Third, these effects on liking 
and identification were stronger for rehearsed stimuli than for non-rehearsed stimuli. Finally, 
stimuli presented individually were more liked and identified with overall than those presented 
as trios.  
All but two of these sixteen findings were statistically significant, the exception being 
liking and identification with rehearsed as compared to non-rehearsed images (collapsed across 
singletons and trios), ps = 0.19. However, these rehearsal effects were moderated by stimulus 
role (singleton or trio) for both identification, F(1,249) = 5.43, p = 0.02, and marginally for 
liking, F(1,249) = 2.95, p = 0.09. Rehearsed images were only more identified with, F(1,249) = 
                                                          
7 In addition to this problem, the extra 5-6 stimulus presentations resulted in a total of 14 presentations for 
previously rehearsed and non-rehearsed stimuli before the BIAT. Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analysis indicates that 
presentation boredom effects can start at presentation frequencies as low as 10. 
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4.12, p = 0.04, d = 0.28, and liked, F(1,249) = 3.73, p = 0.05, d = 0.25, relative to non-rehearsed 
images when they appeared as trios. Means and details of statistical tests are provided in Figure 4 
and Table 3. Results of counterbalancing analyses can be found in the Online Supplement. 
 
 
Stimulus familiarity. Each rehearsed stimulus was judged to have been presented more 
times (M = 20) than each non-rehearsed stimulus (M = 15), which were in turn judged to have 
been presented more times than each novel stimulus (M = 11). All of these differences between 
presentation conditions were statistically significant. At the time of these measures, the rehearsed 
and non-rehearsed stimuli had each been presented nine times in the 2-back task and three 
additional times to obtain explicit liking and identification measures, while the novel stimuli had 
been presented only three times for the explicit measures. The relatively large overestimation for 
novel stimuli may have stemmed from the difficulty of discriminating among the stimuli, leading 
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Figure 4. Experiment 4a & 4b explicit liking and identification for rehearsed and non-rehearsed letter strings 
and images relative to novel stimuli. Measures are reported in standard deviation units to permit comparison 
of effect magnitudes across measures and experiments. Positive scores indicate greater liking for rehearsed or 
non-rehearsed than novel stimuli. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Explicit measures are shown only 
for the 251 participants who completed them first. Those for participants who completed BIAT measures first 
are presented in the online supplement.
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participants to guess and to err in the direction of the average number of presentations for the full 
set of stimuli. Details of statistical tests are provided in Table 3. 
Implicit liking. The BIAT showed a preference for both rehearsed and non-rehearsed 
images (respectively, M = 0.17, SD = 0.98; M = 0.31, SD = 1.03) and strings (respectively, M = 
0.14, SD = 1.01; M = 0.23, SD = 0.99) over novel stimuli8. All but one of these four findings 
were statistically significant, the exception being preference for rehearsed as compared to novel 
strings, p = 0.17.  However, there was no significant benefit of rehearsal relative to non-
rehearsed exposure. Details of statistical tests are provided in Table 3. 
 
  
                                                          
8 These effects differed across Experiments 4a and 4b, such that preference for previously exposed stimuli 
(rehearsed or non-rehearsed) over novel stimuli was stronger in 4a (M = 0.33) than 4b (M = -0.08) for letter strings, 
F(1,246) = 8.18, p = 0.005, but weaker in 4a  (M = 0.13) than 4b (M = 0.40) for images, F(1,241) = 3.27, p = .07. 
However, the main effect of interest (rehearsal versus non-rehearsal) did not differ across experiments, ps  > 0.44. 
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Table 3 
Statistical analyses of comparisons between rehearsed, non-rehearsed, and novel stimuli on 
measures of liking, identification, and familiarity for Experiments 4a and 4b combined 
Comparison Measure Stimulus F or t  p d 
Greater effect for 
rehearsed stimuli than 
novel stimuli 
Self-report liking Images t(153) = 6.39 10
–9 0.51 
Strings t(96) = 7.65 10–11 0.78 
Self-report 
identification 
Images t(153) = 7.26 10–11 0.58 
Strings t(96) = 7.46 10–11 0.76 
Stimulus 
familiarity 
Images t(153) = 15.38 10–32 1.27 
Strings t(96) = 6.83 10–21 1.08 
Implicit liking Images t(148) = 2.01 0.05 .16 Strings t(95) = 1.39 0.17 .14 
Greater effect for 
non-rehearsed stimuli 
than novel stimuli 
Self-report liking Images t(96) = 3.84 10
–4 .39 
Strings t(153) = 3.04 0.003 0.24 
Self-report 
identification 
Images t(96) = 6.11 10–8 0.62 
Strings t(153) = 4.49 10–5 0.36 
Stimulus 
familiarity 
Images t(96) = 6.83 10–9 0.70 
Strings t(153) = 8.22 10–13 0.67 
Implicit liking Images t(95) = 2.92 0.004 0.30 Strings t(153) = 2.90 0.004 0.23 
Greater effect for 
rehearsed than non-
rehearsed stimuli 
Self-report liking Images F(1,249) = 1.72 0.19 0.17 Strings F(1,249) = 33.69 10–8 0.72 
Self-report 
identification 
Images F(1,249) = 1.74 0.19 0.18 
Strings F(1,249) = 25.17 10–6 0.62 
Stimulus 
familiarity 
Images t(249) = 3.48 0.001 0.46 
Strings t(249) = 3.88 10–4 0.49 
Implicit liking Images t(243) = -1.11 0.27 -0.14 Strings t(248) = -0.68 0.50 -0.09 
Greater effect for 
single stimulus 
presentations than  
grouped presentations 
Self-report liking Images F(1,249) = 21.49 10
–5 0.27 
Strings F(1,249) = 7.18 .008 0.18 
Self-report 
identification 
Images F(1,249) = 9.91 0.002 0.17 
Strings F(1,249) = 12.68 10–4 0.25 
Running head: MENTAL REHEARSAL 
Mediation analyses. Mediation tests examined whether the superior effect of rehearsal 
(relative to novel stimuli) on explicit liking was mediated by the effect on explicit identification, 
as well as the possible reverse direction of mediation. These analyses used 10,000 bootstrap 
resamples of the data with the SPSS MEMORE macro of Montoya & Hayes (2016) for within-
subjects mediation. All tests combined stimulus type and singleton and trio stimuli, as rehearsal 
effects were not moderated by presentation grouping. Although the authors are skeptical about 
mediation tests of these types, their results are nevertheless informative. 
Mediation tests for the effect of rehearsed versus novel stimuli. Mental rehearsal 
increased both liking of and identification with stimuli, b = 0.81, SE = 0.07, t(250) = 11.40, p < 
0.0001; b = 1.31, SE = 0.11, t(250) = 11.70, p < 0.0001. When examining both identification and 
mental rehearsal as predictors of liking, identification was significantly related to liking, b = 
0.37, SE = 0.04, t(248) = 10.59, p < 0.0001. The effect of mental rehearsal on liking remained 
significant, b = 0.32, SE = 0.07, t(248) = 4.40, p < 0.0001, but was significantly reduced, b = 
0.49, SE = 0.06, CI95 = 0.36 to 0.61, suggesting mediation of the effect of rehearsal on liking by 
identification. 
In the reverse mediation pathway test with both predictors, liking was significantly 
related to identification, b = 0.92, SE = 0.08, t(248) = 10.92, p < 0.0001. The effect of mental 
rehearsal on identification remained significant, b = 0.57, SE = 0.11, t(248) = 5.04, p < 0.0001, 
but was significantly reduced, b = 0.75, SE = 0.09, CI95 = 0.57 to 0.93, suggesting mediation of 
the effect of rehearsal on identification by liking. 
Mediation test for the effect of non-rehearsed versus novel stimuli. Non-rehearsed 
exposure increased both liking of and identification with stimuli, b = 0.19, SE = 0.06, t(250) = 
3.13, p = 0.002; b = 0.53, SE = 0.09, t(250) = 5.72, p < 0.0001. When examining both 
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identification and non-rehearsed exposure as predictors of liking, identification was significantly 
related to liking, b = 0.44, SE = 0.03, t(248) = 13.13, p < 0.0001. The effect of non-rehearsed 
exposure on liking was no longer significant, b = -0.04, SE = 0.05, t(248) = -0.73, p = 0.46, and 
was significantly reduced, b = 0.23, SE = 0.04, CI95 = 0.15 to 0.32, suggesting mediation by 
identification. 
In the reverse mediation pathway, liking was significantly related to identification, b = 
1.00, SE = 0.08, t(248) = 13.20, p < 0.0001. The effect of non-rehearsed exposures on 
identification remained significant, b = 0.33, SE = 0.07, t(248) = 4.72, p < 0.0001, but was 
significantly reduced, b = 0.19, SE = 0.06, CI95 = 0.07 to 0.32, suggesting mediation by liking. 
Discussion 
Both Experiments 4a and 4b demonstrated that rehearsed stimuli were more liked and 
identified with than non-rehearsed stimuli on explicit measures, which in turn were both more 
liked and more identified with than novel stimuli. This suggests that mental rehearsal enhances 
repeated exposure effects, although this finding was more robust for letter string than for image 
stimuli. All of these effects were similar in magnitude between the two sub-experiments, 
although the stimulus presentation procedures differed notably:  The stimuli were presented for 
fixed durations in Experiment 4a, and for self-paced durations in Experiment 4b. However, these 
findings were not completely confirmed on implicit measures – although rehearsed and non-
rehearsed stimuli were preferred over novel stimuli, rehearsed stimuli were not significantly 
preferred over non-rehearsed stimuli.  It was possible that the extra categorization task preceding 
the IAT measure, by itself providing some mental rehearsal, might have weakened the test of the 
effect of mental rehearsal.  
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Importantly, Experiment 4 disentangled the roles of rehearsal and grouping in stimulus 
liking and identification. Indeed, the rehearsal effect found in previous experiments for grouped 
stimuli extended to singly presented stimuli, more clearly connecting these research procedures 
with procedures of past mere exposure studies. Because singly presented stimuli were more, 
rather than less, liked than grouped presentations, this confirms the role of mental rehearsal as an 
explanation of the results, rather than categorization of stimuli into groups. These findings not 
only contradict the PF/M expectation of reduced effects when presented stimuli are better 
remembered (e.g., Bornstein, 1989), but it also contradicts the previously plausible implicit 
partisanship interpretation that categorization of stimuli into groups might have been a 
substantial cause of the enhanced liking and identification findings reported by Greenwald, 
Pickrell, and Farnham (2002).   
General Discussion 
 Four experiments examined effects of repeated mental rehearsal of novel stimuli on 
liking for the stimuli and association of the stimuli with self (identification).  Three types of 
stimuli were used: isolated consonants, pronounceable 5-letter non-word strings, and abstract 
drawings.  Two types of mental rehearsal procedures were used: retaining stimuli continuously in 
memory or retaining stimuli in memory for several seconds in anticipation of judging whether a 
subsequent stimulus matched the rehearsed stimulus.  Across the variations of stimulus types and 
rehearsal procedures, stronger effects on the attitude and identification measures were uniformly 
obtained when stimuli were mentally rehearsed than when they were seen for the same durations 
without rehearsal. These results did not depend on categorizing stimuli into groups. 
 Aggregate effect sizes for the impact of mental rehearsal, relative to non-rehearsal, were 
g = 0.42 for explicit liking, g = 0.50 for implicit liking, g = 0.54 for explicit identification, and 
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g = 0.58 for implicit identification. For the impact of mental rehearsal relative to no previous 
exposures, aggregate effect sizes were g = 0.63 for explicit liking, g = 0.15 for implicit liking, 
and g = 0.65 for explicit identification. Finally, for the impact of non-rehearsal relative to no 
previous exposures, aggregate effect sizes were g = 0.30 for explicit liking, g = 0.25 for implicit 
liking, and g= 0.48 for explicit identification9. 
 Experiment 4’s findings of (a) strong correlations between liking and identification and 
(b) mutual mediation of liking by identification and of identification by liking are more 
consistent with the conclusion that rehearsed or non-rehearsed exposures had parallel effects on 
liking and identification than with either directional mediation hypothesis.  
A Theoretical Puzzle 
 While sharing components of procedures with previous studies of mere exposure (Zajonc, 
1968) and minimal groups (Tajfel et al., 1971), this research’s mental rehearsal procedures also 
diverged from both of those traditions. They differed from most prior mere exposure research by 
instructing subjects to mentally rehearse novel stimuli, and they differed from all prior mere 
exposure research by including dependent measures of association of stimuli with self. This 
research’s procedures also differed from minimal group research by using a main independent 
variable of minimal group research—association with self—instead as one of the research’s two 
dependent variables.   
 One approach to interpreting similar findings from mere exposure, minimal group, and 
mental rehearsal procedures is to consider the possibility that they share a common theoretical 
                                                          
9 A random effects meta-analysis using SPSS macros described by Lipsey & Wilson (2001) was conducted on all 
bias-corrected effect sizes included in the main text and online supplement (including the pilot experiment and “task 
set 2” for all experiments), with the exception of the explicit measures completed after implicit measures in 
Experiment 4. All of these effects were statistically significant, ps < 0.02. 
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mechanism.  This approach runs rapidly into challenges.  First, the well-regarded fluency 
interpretation of exposure effects on valence is at best awkward (as explained in the introduction) 
in explaining the effect of mental rehearsal on valence.  The problem: rehearsal may raise 
subjects’ awareness of presented stimuli enough to give subjects a basis for discounting an 
interpretation of experienced fluency as positive valence.  Second, the minimal group effect has 
no plausible connection to a fluency interpretation.  Third, the fluency interpretation does not 
account for the effect of mental rehearsal and (more weakly) mere exposure on association with 
self.  Fourth, there remains substantial disagreement on theoretical interpretation for mere 
exposure effects (cf. Zajonc, 2001) and minimal group findings (cf. Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002).  These challenges notwithstanding, the remainder of this article pursues the goal of 
seeking common theoretical ground among the three paradigms.   
 A starting point for theoretical synthesis is available in recent proposals of a theoretical 
connection between the minimal group paradigm and “mere ownership” findings (Beggan, 1992; 
Feys, 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).  In minimal group studies, the subject learns 
that he or she belongs to an unfamiliar group.  In mere ownership procedures, the subject learns 
(approximately) the reverse—that a previously unfamiliar object belongs to him or her.  Both 
procedures establish an association with self that has been described as associative self-
anchoring (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Roth & Steffens, 2014) or as implicit 
self-object linking (Ye & Gawronski, 2016).  Procedures such as these were previously theorized 
to be manifestations of implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  The three italicized 
labels designate phenomena in which subjects show greater liking for an entity to which an 
association with self has been created.  Greenwald and Banaji’s implicit self-esteem conception 
was subsequently integrated into balanced identity theory (Greenwald et al., 2002; Cvencek, 
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Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2012; 2016), which offers theoretical accounts of both minimal group 
findings (Ashburn–Nardo, 2003) and mere ownership findings (Ye & Gawronski, 2016).   
 In this article’s research, both mentally rehearsed stimulus exposures and—to a lesser 
extent—non-rehearsed stimulus exposures produced increased associations of the stimuli with 
self.  Increased association with self thus emerges as a previously unknown (also untheorized 
and uninvestigated) consequence of mere exposure procedures.  This finding poses a strong 
theoretical challenge:  How can association with self result from mental rehearsal of novel 
stimuli and (to a lesser extent) from passive exposure to novel stimuli?   
Self and Memory 
 An expectable consequence of both rehearsed and non-rehearsed stimulus exposures is 
establishment of some memory—even if only weak—for the presented items.  Experiment 3’s 
familiarity measures confirmed this expectation, also showing that rehearsed stimuli were 
remembered to have been presented more times than non-rehearsed ones, even though both had 
equal numbers of presentations.  Might these effects on memory produce increased associations 
with self?  Perhaps surprisingly, a yes answer to this question comes from the history of theory 
and research on the role of the self in human memory.   
 William James’s (1890) treatment of “The Self” in Volume 1 of Principles of Psychology 
laid the foundation for subsequent theorists to describe the self as a primary organization of 
personal knowledge.  Freud (1901/1917) wrote: “. . . an incessant stream of ‘self-reference’ 
flows through my thoughts concerning which I usually have no inkling . . . .  It seems as if I were 
forced to compare with my own person all that I hear about strangers, as if my personal 
complexes became stirred up at every information from others.  It seems impossible that this 
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should be an individual peculiarity of my own person; it must, on the contrary, point to the way 
we grasp outside matters in general.” (pp. 41–42)  Psychiatrist Édouard Claparède (1911) 
interpreted the anterograde amnesia of his Korsakoff syndrome patient as a failure of the patient 
to connect new experiences to the patient’s self.  Involvement of the self as a cognitive 
organization central to memory was developed even more extensively in Kurt Koffka’s (1935) 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology (see especially pp. 319–342, 514–528, and 591–614).   
 More than four decades after Koffka’s book, in the mid-1970s social cognition and 
cognitive psychological researchers produced a substantial body of research that empirically 
established relationships between self and memory. These included self-generation effects, self-
reference effects, and ego-involvement effects (reviewed in Greenwald, 1981).  These 
phenomena involved demonstrations that tasks requiring encoding an event in relation to one’s 
self benefited memory for the event more than did a wide variety of alternative memory-
encoding tasks. 
 If, as Freud, Claparède, and Koffka supposed, one’s self is a primary organization of 
personal knowledge (an idea developed further by Greenwald, 1980, and Greenwald & 
Pratkanis, 1984), then it becomes plausible that ordinary acquisition of new memories involves 
attaching those potentially memorable events to the self’s organization of knowledge (see 
Cunningham & Turk, 2017 for an overview of self-processing biases).  In this fashion, formation 
of memories through mental rehearsal may provide the common ingredient that allows four 
procedures—minimal groups, mere exposure, mere ownership, and mental rehearsal—to produce 
increased association with self (identification). With establishment of a connection to self, a link 
to positive valence follows directly due to the self’s well known affective positivity (for the great 
majority of people — see review by Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984, pp. 151–156; also 
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Cunningham & Turk, 2017).  This description of the self’s role implies that association with self 
might mediate the effect of mental rehearsal on valence.  However, evidence for unidirectional 
mediation was lacking in the tests available in present Experiment 4, for which it was more 
plausible that effects of mental rehearsal on association with self and association with positive 
valence occurred in parallel.  These parallel effects have a theoretical interpretation in balanced 
identity theory (Greenwald et al., 2002).  However, the theoretical principles of balanced identity 
were hardly new in 2002, having relatively direct roots in Heider’s (1946; 1958) theorization, 
along with less direct roots in the past work on self and memory cited in this Discussion. 
Conclusion 
 This article’s studies of mental rehearsal extend previous findings by showing that liking 
for and identification with novel stimuli occur with widely varied stimuli and varied rehearsal 
procedures.  These effects consistently exceeded effects produced by stimuli encountered 
without rehearsal.  The robustness of these findings, along with their theorized connection—via 
the self’s organization of knowledge— to previously established minimal group, mere exposure, 
and mere ownership findings, suggests their potential for useful applications.  
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